I’m a PhD Candidate in Political Economics at the Stanford Graduate School of Business. I’m fascinated by questions that explore the interplay between political institutions and economic development. Under what conditions do economic shocks trigger political reform? How do political institutions influence market structures? How does the regulatory and political environment influence the structure of financial institutions? I tackle these questions using a variety of methods, including formal models, collecting archival data, and causal inference techniques.

In my current research agenda, I study the Act of Union passed by the Parliament of Scotland in 1707. This act ended the Scottish Parliament and joined Scotland with England to create a United Kingdom. I investigate how the catastrophic failures of a Scottish joint-stock company in 1699 impacted the choices of Scottish politicians and the structure of the Scottish parliament in the lead up to union. Moreover, I investigate the effect of England’s promise to fully compensate Scottish investors on the willingness of Scottish politicians to vote for union. My findings suggest that a majority of the Scottish parliament would not have supported union without the lure of English gold. This moment in history reveals the sheer power of financial incentives to drive radical institutional change, even when this change weakens the power of political elites.